Wells seeks to enforce a compensation agreement expressly provided for by ERISA. For this provision to be fully cost-effective under ERISA, the parties to these agreements must be able to implement it. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that the agreement is applicable, as a matter of common law, provided it is not contrary to section 410 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. In this regard, Wells asks the Tribunal to find that national contract law is not anticipated by ERISA with respect to compensation agreements. Given that ERISA is expressly considering the existence of certain compensation agreements, p. 29.C. The Tribunal considers that this argument is not available. However, these arguments are not in the draft. The rules of federal common law are governed by the general directives and procedures described in the ERISA, but they are not limited by the specific language of the statute. The real objective of the creation of a common federal law is to fill the gaps left by the explicit provisions of ERISA.
See Castonguay, 984 F.2d to 1523. The fact that ERISA itself only gives room to certain classes and provides limited relief is therefore not temporary. As has already been said, a rule providing for a mechanism for the implementation of compensation agreements is not at odds with and thereby at odds with the legal system of ERISA as a whole. The Tribunal finds that each of the other District Court cases in which the compensation agreements were struck down under ERISA has key factors that distinguish it from this case. To Donovan v. Cunningham, the court found that a compensation agreement, which was part of a plan covered by ERISA, was not reached. 541 Supp. 276, 289 (S.D.Tex.1982), aff`d partially rev`d, partially evacuated for various reasons, 716 F.2d 1455 (5. Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251, 104 P.
Ct. 3533, 82 L Ed. 2d 839 (1984). However, the Tribunal`s main justification for its decision was that the plan covered by ERISA would itself bear the financial burden of compensation. It found that such a situation was inconsistent with ERISA 410, 29 U.S.C 1110, in part because it was not a «simple transfer of liability from an agent in the same way as insurance.» Donovan, 541 F. Supp. 289. The purpose of the court was to protect the plan itself from the costs resulting from the prosecution. There is no possibility that the beneficiaries themselves will suffer from the implementation of the agreement.  The Tribunal finds that the agreement at issue is not contrary to ERISA No. 410, 29 U.S.C No. 1110 and is therefore enforceable by Wells.
This type of agreement, which compensates an agent of the plan (Wells) by an employer (Bourns), was explicitly considered by DOL as a type of compensation agreement valid in accordance with ERISA No. 410. See 29 C.F.R. 2509.75-4, example (1) a). In addition, the agreement does not unduly relieve Wells of any liability related to Wells` actions as agent of the plan, but requires Bourns, «to the extent that ERISA allows it,» to compensate Wells for certain debts. Instead of unloading Wells from its obligations, the contract defers its potential liability as an agent in the same way as insurance.  The Ninth Arrondissement also decided that the application of the state law in which the appeal takes place is inappropriate as the correct federal decision rule. The choice of a specific state law «does not make much sense if we look at a comprehensive regulatory law that explicitly prejudges state law and wants to impose a uniform federal system.» Castonguay, 984 F.2d to 1523 n.
5; See also LEE, 953 F.2d 543, 546 (9. Cir.1992). However, the federal law on the declaration of the enforceable force of compensation agreements, applied by the Tribunal in this case, is followed by the general law of the state.